Fundamentals versus Beliefs under Almost Common Knowledge

The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under "Almost Common Knowledge"

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The formation of share market prices under heterogeneous beliefs and common knowledge

Financial economic models often assume that investors know (or agree on) the fundamental value of the shares of the firm, easing the passage from the individual to the collective dimension of the financial system generated by the Share Exchange over time. Our model relaxes that heroic assumption of one unique ”true value” and deals with the formation of share market prices through the dynamic f...

Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is ...

Incomplete Preferences under Uncertainty: Indecisiveness in Beliefs versus Tastes

Almost common priors

What happens when priors are not common? We introduce a measure for how far a type space is from having a common prior, which we term prior distance. If a type space has δ prior distance, then for any bet f it cannot be common knowledge that each player expects a positive gain of δ times the sup-norm of f , thus extending no betting results under common priors. Furthermore, as more information ...