منابع مشابه
Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory
This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topices include: Nash implementability and the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, two-party competition in tournaments, binary agendas and the top cycle, and median voter theorems. The paper begins with a simple example to illustrate th...
متن کامل1 Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory
This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topics include Nash implementability, monotonic social choice correspondences, the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, sophisticated solutions of binary agendas, the top cycle of a tournament, the bipartisan set for two-party competition...
متن کاملSocial Choice Theory
1. revised and extended axiomatic theory and proof development. 2. a new curriculum with extensive questions, intuitive illustrations of key concepts, exercises in formal proofs, and an emphasis on the use of mathematical logic as a formal tool for the analysis of informal concept". 3. parallel languages-a completely new formal language containing concise formulas for use in proofs together wit...
متن کاملNotes on Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory is the study of how decisions are made collectively. It examines the idea that, for a given society, the preferences of individuals can be directly aggregated to reflect a quintessential “social preference.” An example of such a preference aggregation method is simple plurality rule, in which citizens vote for a candidate and the candidate winning the most votes is deemed s...
متن کاملSocial Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory
We consider the relationships between the collective preference and noncooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approaches— that in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whe...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quarterly Journal of Political Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1554-0634
DOI: 10.1561/100.00013006