Fundamental Rights as Constraints to and Triggers for Differentiated Integration

When looking for possible constraints on Differentiated Integration, the fundamental values of European Union (EU) seem an obvious starting point. Both Charter Fundamental Rights and articulated in Art. 2 TEU are cross-cutting across EU states. However, while have acted as centralising devices other federal settings, context marked by extensive value disagreement, they may also act pathways differentiation. Insofar national constitutional orders disagree scope rights, attempts to ground law trigger inevitable interpretive conflicts This paper will use examples asylum Arrest Warrant demonstrate this argument: a reason harmonise states, such be invoked question principle mutual trust underlying legal order, thereby causing rather than limiting Die Grundwerte der sind ein naheliegender Ausgangspunkt auf Suche nach möglichen Beschränkungen Differenzierter Integration. Sowohl die Grundrechtecharta als auch EUV formulierten Werte gelten für alle EU-Staaten gleichermassen. Obwohl Menschenrechte anderen föderalen Strukturen Mittel Zentralisierung fungiert haben, können sie innerhalb EU, welcher Werteverständnisse stark voneinander abweichen, zu Differenzierung führen. In dem Masse wie nationale Verfassungsordnungen sich über Reichweite von EU-Rechten uneinig sind, lösen Versuche, Unionsrecht gemeinsame stützen, notwendigerweise Interpretationskonflikte zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten aus. Dieser Beitrag erarbeitet dieses Arguments anhand Beispiele des Asylrechts und Europäischen Haftbefehls. Während das einerseits im Sinne Harmonisierung zunutze machen kann, diese andererseits geltend gemacht werden, um Grundsatz gegenseitigen Vertrauens, Rechtsordnung zugrunde liegt, Frage stellen. Hierdurch wird eher verursacht begrenzt. Lorsque l'on cherche d'éventuelles contraintes à l’Intégration Différenciée, les valeurs fondamentales sont un point de départ évident. Tant la Charte droits fondamentaux que énoncées dans l’article TUE transversales aux États. Toutefois, si ont joué rôle centralisateur d’autres systèmes fédéraux, contexte européen caractérisé par le désaccord sur valeurs, elles peuvent également favoriser différenciation. ordres constitutionnels nationaux en portée européens, tentatives d’ancrer droit l’Union ces déclencheront inévitablement conflits d’interprétation. Pour démontrer cet argument, utilise exemples l’asile et du mandat d’arrêt : peut utiliser comme raison pour harmoniser, être invoquées contester principe confiance mutuelle lequel se base l’ordre juridique européen, provoquant ainsi différenciation au lieu limiter. rights (FR) limit Integration (DI) so far suggest set that common hence not subject differentiation based optimization state preferences (Lenaerts 2019: 783).11 We term DI refer differences formal applicability rules As we discuss more informal forms e.g. interpretation application rules, ‘differentiation’ wider type DI. is re-enforced certain features FR. They are, since 2001, codified into single document, (hereafter: Charter), interpreted overseen central Court, Court Justice (CJEU). Like most bills found necessarily carries character (Eeckhout 2002). While it contains provisions its scope, these been broadly CJEU. Within Charter, take autonomous form, defined with reference standards, but operating independently them. last decades seen various DI, place under shadow which constitutes outer within structures law. States can opt-out policies, cannot rights. not, however, end story. FR The first triggers story taking field protection itself. Even if societies agree importance does imply their meaning, or standard imply. Differentiation thus triggered interaction between centralised de-centralised human systems (that diverge what standards require). Certain make diversity likely, requirement undermine level offered constitutions international (Art. 53). second external per concerns consideration derogate from policies. development EU’s acquis has long understood defensive, i.e. strategy governments reasons restrict supremacy (Smismans 2010). debate given renewed attention decade instruments, particularly Area Freedom, Security (AFSJ), recognition orders. These instruments work ineffectively when do each other’s ability safeguard norms. result, judges depart legislation require. either triggering disagreement derogation, leading different meaning those defy policies because see core right being violated. both cases, place, meanings Europe. AFSJ explore two It area perfectly encapsulates elements differently member states (such defence) legislative frequently challenged Courts would violate obligations grounded domestic analysis focus fields AFSJ, namely judicial cooperation criminal matters selected very susceptible implications (Xanthopoulou 2018: 492). Moreover, comparison areas further prompted fact CJEU transposed decisions developed one (asylum) another (cooperation matters) (Anagnostaras 2016: 1677). More particularly, chart fate sets illustrate paradox touches questions – aim (by establishing justice particular matters, including harmonised standards), equally prompt vague tests applied degrees Courts). Dublin III Regulation responsibility examining application, (EAW) framework decision useful testing exploring ‘limits’ thesis limits policy To analyse how relates differentiation, article examines case-law: i) 16 prominent cases interpreting instruments22 relevance was assessed through scholarship (e.g. case-notes discussion high-level journals Law Journal, Review Common Market Review). ii) courts’ judgments three Member (Germany, France Netherlands) concerning instruments.33 regards choice States, asylum, focused countries had no borders, where expected highest volume transfer according Regulation. Further relevant criteria were authors’ knowledge language system accessibility judgments. regard, country fitted best all Germany, biggest stems country. database used https://www.juris.de/jportal/index.jsp. For French law, Database Asylum available at: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/it/case-law-search. Dutch consulted https://www.rechtspraak.nl/. selection judgments, open access case-law http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en. Examining relationship recognition, important democratic reasons. Mutual posited nascent illustration demoi-cracy notion peoples ‘govern together one’ (Nicolaidis 2017). By seeking recognizing must traditions mechanism foster integration face legitimate Alternatively, theorists sought anchor Union’s legitimacy politics connection justice, defence element (Neyer investigating relation therefore seek shed light, perspective, competing visions DI’s implications. structured follows: section 2, complexity framework, outline illustrating degree norms, interest implementation. Section 3 mechanisms seeks differentiated at levels governance - Human (ECtHR) produced increasingly fragmented framework. Finally, 4 causal explain drives and, likely conclude inherently ambiguous only ‘unifying’ forces inevitably pluralist nature order. encompasses fields, pursue goals balance interests (Maiani Migliorini 2020: 28). Particularly enhancement building System (CEAS) form object tied Schengen Agreements create without internal borders 11-12; Mitsilegas 2016a: 23). made ‘trust-based instruments’ 14). relied instrument ‘mutual recognition’ tool (Rizcallah 38). On hand, permitted advance having fully procedural 38-39). enactment presupposes considerable (Herlin-Karnell 142, 146). doctrine trust’ 490), received status CJEU’s Opinion 2/13 accession ECHR (CJEU 2014; Brouwer 896; Marguery 943-944). remain 26-29; Moraru 40). necessity high clear comes allowed avoid vertically transferring sovereignty (Poiares Maduro 2007: 818-819; Schmidt 672). At same time, obligation recognize enforce foreign limited possibility exercise review confers them extraterritorial effects (Düsterhaus 2015: 155-157; 2016b: 126). problem heightened obliged execute compliance 36). taken account already concede room discretion authorities courts varying (see Maiani 16-17, 26-27). Accordingly, there 26-27), divergences accommodate conflicts. against backdrop jurisprudence should understood. Framework Decision Warrant. Its goal enable easier surrender persons purpose prosecution execution custodial sentence State whose authority issued warrant. Such simplified procedure rendered necessary opening border regime (Mitsilegas 125). entails seized request judgment imposing sentence, whether intended raises 25). Automaticity presumption respect 146; 128). exhaustively lists grounds refusal Significantly, general derogation clause due violation (Brouwer 912; 131). conscious legislator led deny provided itself 1676). notorious Melloni case 2013), stressed assuring effectiveness 133). Spanish Constitutional raised warrant entitled apply higher granted clearly denied highlighting frustrated rule 1684-1685). consensus reached saw left 135). might less pressing, ‘compelled’ There is, fact, place; expression distrust Nevertheless, precondition allocation competences. agreed upon shall responsible processing applications.44 See Article 3(1) former II 343/2003, almost unchanged reformed 604/2013. purpose, establishes determining jurisdiction over practice arrival 906).55 13 consequence, seekers transferred State. A declaring incompetent seeker 25; Xanthopoulou 490). unlike put cooperation, required mandatory 3(2) way declare themselves competent even though differently. Thus, although foreseeing explicit dictated concerns, still enjoyed margin assessing application. held throughout pervades system, ‘raison d’être’66 Case C-411/10, NS others, para. 83. 2017: 813). argument 2011) did other, applicable understanding developments. Notwithstanding commitment upholding trust, Court’s evolved significantly. argued that, passed phase characterized ‘blind towards gradual acceptance rebutted 2018). major evolution occurred Greece condemned ECtHR collapsing system. MSS v. Belgium (ECtHR 2011), Strasbourg treatment amounted ECHR, prohibition inhumane degrading treatment. infringing non-refoulement deciding (where could foreseen). Confronted decision, ruling, admitted rebutted. clear, every suffice.77 Ibid., 84. accordance ECtHR, illegal suffer receiving State.88 86. National determine case, ‘if substantial believing systemic flaws reception conditions’.99 Ibid. Hence, limitations, introducing ‘systemic deficiencies’ threshold 908; similar observed Varga Others Hungary 2015) several Romania 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) view overcrowded conditions prisons, violated torture 3. failures prison some affect functioning Aranyosi Căldăraru 2016), absolute torture, postponed until ascertained risk person dispelled 150). Whether exists, examined case. Analogously situation established NS, occur evidence presents ‘deficiencies, generalised, groups people, places detention’.1010 Joined Cases C‑404/15 C‑659/15 PPU, Căldăraru, -para. 89. need after exists individual stricter requiring additional concretisation 495-496). With landmark decisions, sense opened window rebuttal serious violations, kept small, derogations strictly. allow rebut 1690-1601). deficiencies’, describing courts, attempted maintain control principles 494-496). presence deficiencies State’s allows examine 1693-1696; 40-42; 494-496) reflected prevent far-reaching review, hampered crucial Migliorin implementation homogenous diverging results (Moraru 41-42; 48-49). Europe gave assessments experiencing flaws. quashed Italy citing especially poor housing Darmstadt Administrative 2014), others tended rely yet determined Munich 2016). Similarly, assessment Hungary, condemn validate transfers Dresden whereas regarded unlawful Council explicitly contradicting (Bremen 2015). An analogous regard (although test requires assessment, opens outcomes). Besides difficulties applying uniformly practice, approach criticised literature giving precedence protection. Many scholars called shift away comprehensive 151-152; 499-500). vagueness consciously deficiencies’-test asylum.1111 (2016: 48-49) refers refusing Dresden’s allowing (Dresden 2016a, ruling CK 2017), appears begun direction (Gill-Pedro Groussot 271-272; 429-431; 497-498). Here, Croatia incompatible absence Croatian Although ground-breaking overestimated (Imamović Muir 2017; Ladenburger 164-165), President himself quoted example efforts reconcile redefine completely give up illegal.1212 E.g. Paris Tribunal (2018) Appeal (2018), Bulgaria irrespective deficiencies. later rulings Jawo 2019) Ibrahim 2019a), referred again deficiencies’,1313 85 paras. 88-89 2019a). suggesting maintains exceptional. Taking developments together, complicated picture: remains guiding (one framework) filled gaps exceptions. concern trans-national forced respond increasing ‘cycle’ next section. Now overall snapshot tell us about processes occurs corrected? distinguish here centripetal centrifugal mechanisms, fragment cycle starts force, discussed, pieces principles, lay-out minimum work. includes for/limit principles. highlighted Melloni, largely deferential harmonization attempting, possible, result settled managed Beneath multiple dialogue highly nature. simple terms, once (relatively) unified began political actors terms. revision regulation followed severe criticism MSS. bound obligations, little alternative institutions respond. therefore, added exception normal heavily jurisprudence. then turn inserted follows Gareth Davies