Functional Form of Nonmanipulable Social Choice Functions with Two Alternatives

نویسندگان

چکیده

We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions on universal domain and an arbitrary, possibly infinite, set agents. In order to achieve this, we considered the more general case two-valued describe structure family consisting groups agents having no power determine values function. With help such structure, introduce class that call powerless revealing show are ones.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2227-7390']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/math9212827