Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria
We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires truth telling by each agent to be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelationmechanism, and every Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism to be f optimal. We show that restricted monotonicity plus an auxiliary condition is necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation, and that full-truthful Nash implementation is eq...
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A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a compl...
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Weconsider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f -optimal outcome. We show that restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for ful...
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Weconsider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f -optimal outcome. We show that restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for ful...
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We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(87)90019-x