Full Insurance, Asymmetric Information and Genetic Testing

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance Market an Iranian Insurance Company

The presence of asymmetric information is an important source of efficiency loss for insurance companies and could reduce profitability. In this paper, we test the conditional independence of coverage choice and risk, where “conditional” means conditional on all variables observed by the insurer. We use two parametric methods: a pair of probits and a bivariate probit model. The data includes al...

asymmetric information in iran’s insurance market: case study for automobile insurance in iran insurance company

asymmetric information in iran’s insurance market: case study for automobile insurance in iran insurance companythis research aims to test the presence of asymmetric information by using the dynamic information of automobile policyholders in the iran insurance company (iic). the conditional independence test is conducted by bivariate probit model, the dynamic properties which are presented for ...

Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information *

The paper surveys a number of recent empirical studies that test for or evaluate the importance of asymmetric information in insurance relationships. I first discus the main conclusions reached by insurance theory in a both a static and a dynamic framework. A particular emphasis is put on the testable consequences that can be derived from existing models. I review several studies exploiting the...

Statement on Genetic Testing and Insurance

Asymmetric Information in Iranian's Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.

BACKGROUND Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of insurance market via its two consequences, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. OBJECTIVE Th...