Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.
We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience...
متن کاملWhat can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?
Illusions have become an invaluable tool for investigating how the sense of a body as one’s own is constructed and maintained: During the rubber hand illusion (RHI, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), congruent touch to one’s hidden hand and a fake counterpart produces an illusion of feeling the touch on the fake hand and, more strikingly, an experience of the fake hand as part of one’s body (Ehrsson e...
متن کاملA generative model of body ownership and minimal selfhood
...................................................................................................................................... 3 Zusammenfassung ...................................................................................................................... 4 List of original articles ....................................................................................................
متن کاملWhy are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research1
This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of "minimal phenomenal selfhood," which refers t...
متن کاملThe Problem of Explaining Phenomenal Selfhood: A Comment on Thomas Metzinger’s Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
Thomas Metzinger argues that phenomenal selves are appearances produced by the ongoing operations of a “self-model” that simulates, emulates, and represents aspects of the system’s states to itself – and not substantial things. In this essay, I explain the nature of phenomenal selfhood and then describe the most important problem that arises in connection with explaining phenomenal selfhood. I ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Trends in Cognitive Sciences
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1364-6613
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003