Fuel Input Substitution under Tradable Carbon Permits System: Evidence from Finnish Energy Plants 2005-2008
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Welfare Gains under Tradable CO2 Permits
Introduction It is easy to understand the opposition to liberalized trade in established markets: Domestic producers loose from increased foreign competition. It is harder to understand the opposition to creating markets, including international markets, where they currently do not exist. Many economists and policymakers have proposed establishing tradable carbon permits to decrease the cost of...
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I explore the advantages of tradable emission permits over uniform emission standards when the regulator has incomplete information on firms’ emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in large cities). Because the regulator only observes each firm’s abatement technology but neither its emissions nor its output, there are cases in which standards can lead to lower emis...
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In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed...
متن کاملTradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping
In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed...
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This paper analyzes polluters’ incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Energy Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0195-6574
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.34.2.5