From the summits to the plains: The crisis of Latin American Regionalism

Paraphrasing the German poet Bertolt Brecht's 1949 poem “Wahrnehmung”,1 it can be said that for Latin American regionalism, fatigue of summits has been left behind; must now cope with labors plains. The days when presidents socialized frequently at summit meetings are long gone. In golden age summitry, between 2004 and 2012, four Summits Americas, six summits, 29 South (including Southern Common Market—Mercosur), nine Andean 18 Caribbean 52 Central Bolivarian Alliance Peoples Our America (ALBA) eight Ibero-American were held, a total 144 in 9 years (Portales, 2014, p. 56). It was time Chilean President Sebastián Piñera (Cooperativa, 2011) complained ironically had so many looked like mountain range. Christopher Sabatini (2012) argued Foreign Policy that, “the Western Hemisphere strong claim to title capital world,” adding “if number measure quality diplomacy, would utopia harmony, cooperation, understanding.” As comments show, proliferation often ridiculed or problematized. Secretary-General General Secretariat (SEGIB), Enrique V. Iglesias (2014, 7), referred “syndrome cumbritis” “summit fatigue.” presidential also subject academic debates on their merits dysfunctional aspects (Jarque et al., 2009; Mace 2016; Ortiz, 2013). From positive perspective, diplomacy created climate trust facilitated political agreements, strengthened multilateralism promoted regional integration projects (Rojas Aravena, 2009, 30), mechanism crisis management (Tussie, 2016). Summit changed before restrictions Covid-19 pandemic. meet less fewer forums, particularly those from America. 2010 an average 7.6 per year organized participation (without counting European Union–Community States [CELAC] Americas), but fell 4.6 second half decade (see Table 1). fact often, even more, lack meetings, indicators regionalism one its basic components—regional organizations. A vivid example is Union Nations (Unasur), where “golden UNASUR summitry might have 2008–2010 period, string happened rapid succession there enough consensus induce leaders take action” 2016, 83). Eleven Unasur 2008 2014 extraordinary (Dabène, pp. 43–45), related mostly acute crises. Bariloche August only attended by all presidents, subsequently decreased 42–45; Tussie, last took place December 2014. There no 2015, 2017. After Ernesto Samper's mandate as Secretary ended January 2017, member countries could not agree successor, position remained vacant. Finally, April 2018, governments Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru suspended Unasur. later, they withdrew moribund organization. case this organization, interaction resulted first paralysis later disintegration. organization paralyzed result polarization states. Another exemplary CELAC. held Dominican Republic, 10 (with notable absences Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, who least sent representatives). Then, step step, CELAC became paralyzed. collateral damage, longer possible hold Union–CELAC planned October due conflicts within 2019, 2020. decline tragic fate confirm central feature both intergovernmental interpresidential. This combination given impetus integration, especially times leadership (here role pro-tempore presidencies organizations important; Morales Ruvalcaba, 2020) affinities among (Baracaldo & Chenou, 2019). Yet, consensus, these characteristics led deadlocks progress. While presidents' governments' policies strategic decisions crucial success survival organizations, do act vacuum. make political–economic context combines specific structural constraints negative incentives global international economy define (and modify) parameters implementation projects. Presidential activism necessary overcome some discussed below. Meanwhile, same limitations difficult recover, since challenges increased consequences Therefore, road through plain will rocky. purpose article explain why discuss strategies crisis. already pandemic broke out. Over past decade, region suffered, author aptly put it, “a disinvestment spaces coordination multilateral policies” (Pauselli, 2020). represented (CELAC), covered (Unasur) process spread across America, most bad shape. Brazil questioned membership Mercosur, about future course Pacific stagnated downgraded Mexican foreign policy. And ALBA lost attractiveness ongoing Venezuela changes government countries. addition, exacerbated preexisting Economic Commission (ECLAC) study (2020c, 21) 2020 concluded current situation inimical initiatives deepen integration”. hit economic commodities boom ended, economies adjust. period gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 0.4% (ECLAC, 2020a, 8), much worse than so-called 1980s. When signs recovery, full force. massive downturn consequences. According calculations International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Werner 2021), GDP contracted 7.4% (South ?7.1%). ECLAC (2020b, 10–11) forecast people living poverty rise 230 million, 37% population, projected greater inequality income distribution region. dimension, making way out more difficult. dimensions interact, each own dynamic. trade cross-border investment) increases, does pressure actors cooperation. exchange opposite effect. external intervene, give priority negotiations blocs, prefer bilateral agreements. dimension relates assumed easier work together political-ideological affinity. Closer cooperation politically ideologically far apart. divide development 1990 into three periods, characterized different configurations environment. exercise help gain better understanding challenging. environment 1990s conducive Center-left center-right shared common preference under Washington Consensus opening promoting integration. Intraregional (as percentage trade) peaked 1994, share 21.9%. security issues, broad consolidation liberal democracy, which promotion democracy protection clauses (Heine Weiffen, 2015). During beginning century, favorable. “pink tide” center-left governments, (but competition leadership) gave new boost processes reflected (ALBA, Unasur, CELAC) repositioning existing ones (Mercosur). High rates declining debt scope action policy governments. At time, decreased, stronger outward orientation economies. Developments twentieth century show favorable initiatives. stagnation terms regionalization offset social focus Mercosur creation CELAC), rather agenda. Some authors introduced concept “positive integration” approach based building, interdependencies, non-trade issues (Ayuso, 2012; Sanahuja, 2010). sectoral councils, wide range areas public policies, including defense, infrastructure, health, education (Herrero 2015; Hoffmann, 2019; Palestini Agostinis, 2018; Riggirozzi, 2014), thus areas. heyday short.2 environments adverse century. constraints. low regionalization, because extra-regional links intraregional ties. Between (of world regions) 45% trade. contrast, did exceed 20% threshold (Bown 46; IMF, 44). predominance primary sector exports major obstacle industrial sectors interested creating value chains (Viola Lima, 2017). Due boom, products continued decline. (2021, 114), 2010, “Latin undergoing decoupling”. (exports) accounted 15% 2020, (?24%) sharply recent 78) “International Trade Outlook” calculates 12%, lowest mid-1980s. For subregional groupings, intrablock scores lower. 2018–2019 11.4% (Andean Community, 7.2%; Alliance, 2.8%; Market—CACM, 23.8%) 2021, 90) 9% five months 2020c, 8). interest completing Mercosur's customs union declined (Bouzas, Instead, Uruguay discussing idea flexible (MercoPress, 2021) country negotiate free-trade agreements own. unfold increasingly Since middle ideological interstate relations intensified. growing authoritarian tendencies after Maduro came power increase region, turn right-wing other countries, Brazil. But supported Venezuela. hindered joint jeopardized With populist “neo-patriotic” right (Sanahuja López Burian, 2020), (Saraiva Silva, constellation become complicated. aim larger markets stable rules transactions. trade-oriented regionalism. “anti-globalist” questions institutions result, authoritarianism populism constrain possibilities China's presence triggered backlash United States, tried push back influence. Among things, politicization U.S. another arena conflict China States. Trump's protectionist further intensified “bilateralization” placing additional strain factors resilient (Weiffen, weak absent, particular interdependencies (regionalization), institutions, leadership. light institutional structure weakened twenty-first supranational hot topic 1990s, “regionalism light” predominant early (Sanahuja, 2008). following governance binding obligations. Parliaments created, important element technical secretariats CELAC, Alliance. Prosur forums. ad hoc groups—particularly connection Venezuela—such Lima Group. system very unstable institutionalized. powers raise hands promote Mexico's resources centered politics northern neighbor. Domestic dominate focuses partners outside whatsoever (individually nor jointly). Worse, what observed Neither Mexico models fighting while exercising pro tempore presidency organization's agenda, decided suspend faced, reveals remarkably (Briceño-Ruiz Rivarola Puntigliano, 2021; Puntigliano Briceño-Ruiz, resilience necessarily signal progress learning gained previous experiences. mean inertia, regression. may severe unfolds economically unfavorable losing “political gravitation” (Actis Malacalza, 118) danger becoming irrelevant (Malamud Schenoni, Schenoni Malamud, 2021). Tokatlian (2019) rightly points out, weight existence disintegration exacerbate America's dependence, multiple, conflict-prone dependency. “emptied” possibly reached “turning point” (González clearly need rethink (Ominami, 167). Fortin (2020, 16) suggest more-robust de minimis entities, budget permanent secretariat, failure, should reconsidered.” “super form work, question remains how strengthened. secretariat if his seminal “Exit, Voice Loyalty,” Albert O. Hirschman (1970) sketched two options reacting poor performance. If chose exit option, disaffected members leave voice, dissatisfied express discontent get involved remedy deficits. adds loyalty third increases cost leaving potentially activates voice. offers easy options. Exiting involve high costs, shows. One speak kind “soft” attend completely canceled. low. Hirschmanian point view, challenge create voice exiting. option resolving majority decision “vote” attractive strategy. becomes serious blocked made unanimously. Building complicated factor plays role. began, still young organization.3 Other (sub)regional build consolidate loyalties facing crises (such Community; Prieto, How costs increased? possibility strengthen linkages. agrees Riggirozzi Ryan (2021) policymaking analyzed against variety logics yardstick assessing Still, experience shows, foundations remain without material quite symptomatic; exiting any costs. survived despite recurring An every member. regard, proposals such (2021), counteract decoupling revitalize direction. reduce dependency raw-material exports, includes products. companies, small medium-sized exporting markets. proposes fragmentation space convergence harmonizing groupings. view dismantling tariffs, emphasis placed non-tariff harmonization, mutual recognition technical, sanitary, phytosanitary standards. gradual accumulation origin prerequisite intraindustry formation chains. advocates facilitation measures, digital trade), improvement transport logistics infrastructure. Most suggestions new. Four ECLAC, World Bank 2017), IMF (2017), Inter-American Development (IADB) published documents calling area, go beyond reducing tariffs instead removing barriers IADB (Powell, 2017) highlighted 33 preferential data 80), tariff currently approximately 2%. preferences, estimated 78% imports tariffs. Hence, adjustment liberalization paid. 2017 argues ties Mercosur. largest enjoy preferences.4 ECLAC's tabled almost verbatim 4 earlier suggests limited made. wrong, implement. Efforts hampered “centrifugal forces generated region” 114). compete interregional framework “cross-regionalism” (Garzón Nolte, 2018). financial depends harmonization regulations groupings individual countries). field. Bianculli 3) introduces interesting “regional regulatory governance” looks exclusively perspective deregulation contrasted regulation (integration) areas, requires lead race bottom. Regional broadens research Regulations “transnational fields” interdependencies. (networks) non-state actors. dense network costly makes non-binding decisions. stakeholders support certain transnational field challenged. 18) admits, endeavor, inter- transgovernmental nature.” contradict core component. flexibility forms immediately interrupted event presidents. Inter-presidentialism fueled contributed forward, former Executive José Antonio Ocampo (2020) suggested interview El País depoliticized. glance, proposal seems bit naïve, sufficient account incompatible ideas direction little evidence positions converged going depolarization. precisely consideration shielded extent spillover institutions. path unlikely strategy shield substructures realistic. Grugel (2015, 796) once described project team professional specialists charge area having politicians grand unrealistic) statements intent.” deficits Actis Malacalza 125) recently proposed thematic dogmatic ones, pursue Such facilitate opposed fields excludes human rights democracy. sense look experiences ask lessons learned, find strengths councils. They worked differently, networks. Ultimately, functionally differentiated comparison working councils shows group cohesion likely develop defined rationality makers facilitates arguments. involvement officials directives acted impediments independent (Hoffmann, Unfortunately, Unasur's discontinued decision-making bodies arises revived. Perhaps Health Organization (to mention area) single umbrella sub-units. civil society sectoral, technically oriented banks (CAF) “orchestrators” (Palestini, Functional differentiation complex, robust structure, overlapping membership. tradition (Bianculli Weiffen 2013) cooperative (Nolte, function “central organization” 2016) “hub institution” (Cooper Stubbs, carries risk segmented architecture. degree shielding effects functioning forums mitigate polarization, complicates solutions problems porous. overlay them resolve framework. experiencing “de-regionalization problem-solving” (Legler, 150). Venezuela, China, Russia, Iran (Turkey actor). mentioned earlier, battlefields being waged. context, propose active nonalignment, keeping equal distance superpowers geopolitical geo-economic rivalries. goal “to maximize benefits region's trade, investment financing flows, preserve instruments allow implement national models” (Fortin 16). direction, porous part simultaneous proactive engagement complement non-alignment. true González 65) dialogue opposition, peaceful solution country. restricted work. needs forum influence something Security Cooperation Caribbean, include interests Union, Japan, deal demand, reasonable doubts whether accept undermine (OAS). Looking back, Ayuso 166) too regionalisms, worse. Regionalization decline, projects, old appeal. plains rocky long. return wait change Without Venezuelan swamp—the “epicenter (Gonzalez 56)—the inter-presidential decrease. division regimes colors) democracies conceivable revival come relations, events Summit, CELAC–China summit. 785) wrote, “This phase headline-grabbing dramatic America.” statement today. “high-profile regionalism,” lowlands “low-profile regionalism.” contrast went hand launch new, sometimes lofty down-to-earth. come, advance toward expand scope, normative basis. discussion continue architecture crisis-resistant. What “voice” “exit” cooperation? marginal pandemics, ups downs economy, interference reason, Detlef Nolte associate fellow Institute Global Area Studies (GIGA), director (2006–2018) GIGA Studies. He adjunct professor Political Science University Hamburg, Council Relations (DGAP).