From Russia with fear: fear appeals and the patterns of cyber-enabled influence operations

Abstract Much research on influence operations (IO) and cyber-enabled (CEIO) rests the assumption that state-backed digital interference attempts to generically produce sociopolitical division favorable perpetrator’s own interests. And yet, empirical record of malicious IO during 2010s show social media manipulation messaging takes a number forms. In this article, we survey arguments regarding targeting tactics techniques associated with age suggest existing accounts tend ignore strategic context foreign interference. We propose state-sponsored are not unlike conventional political campaigns in they an evolving flow information rooted several key objectives assumptions. However, position actors as outside force constrains opportunities for effective forces certain operational constraints shape practice. These actors, generally unable create sensation from nothing without being unveiled, rely domestic events tied broad macrosocial (e.g. act race violence or protest activity) conditions wherein can be leveraged gain. Once event occurs, belligerents tailor steps taken embed themselves relevant networks goal turning toward some action. illustrate validate framework using content Russian Federation’s coordinated trolling campaign against USA between 2015 2016. deploy testing approach centered fear appeals likely method engaging populations relative triggering find support our framework. Specifically, while strong associations exist ad emissions Facebook societal unrest period, those relationships statistically causal. temporal ordering is highly suggestive strategy responsive dividing events. Of unique interest, also see malware targeted at later stages appeal threat lifecycle, implying lessons specifically interested relationship CEIO disinformation tactics.