From Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Online Selection Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
From Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Online Selection Problems
We consider a general class of online optimization problems, called online selection problems, where customers arrive sequentially, and one has to decide upon arrival whether to accept or reject each customer. If a customer is rejected, then a rejection cost is incurred. The accepted customers are served with minimum possible cost, either online or after all customers have arrived. The goal is ...
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Demand-responsive transport systems use shuttles to provide door-to-door shared-rides for its passengers. The operating cost of the shuttles depends on the pick-up and drop-off locations of the passengers. It is challenging to design a fair cost-sharing mechanism that offers fare quotes to potential passengers without having any knowledge of future ride requests since different passengers cause...
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The problem of sharing the cost of a common infrastructure among a set of strategic and cooperating players has been the subject of intensive research in recent years. However, most of these studies consider cooperative cost sharing games in an offline setting, i.e., the mechanism knows all players and their respective input data in advance. In this paper, we consider cooperative cost sharing g...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2014.0684