Frege, Thomae, and Formalism
نویسندگان
چکیده
Mathematical formalism is the view that numbers are “signs” and arithmetic like a game played with such signs. Frege’s colleague Thomae defended using an analogy chess, critique of this has had major influence on discussions in analytic philosophy about signs, rules, meaning, mathematics. Here I offer new interpretation as by his predecessors, paying close attention to mathematical details historical context. argue for Thomae, formal standpoint algebraic perspective domain objects, “sign” not linguistic expression or mark, but representation object within perspective. exploits shift into give purely construction real from rational numbers. suggest Thomae’s chess intended provide model shifts
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The journal for the history of analytical philosophy
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2159-0303']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v11i2.5366