Frege on Axioms, Indirect Proof, and Independence Arguments in Geometry: Did Frege Reject Independence Arguments?
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Frege on Axioms, Indirect Proof, and Independence Arguments in Geometry: Did Frege Reject Independence Arguments?
It is widely believed that some puzzling and provocative remarks that Frege makes in his late writings indicate he rejected independence arguments in geometry, particularly arguments for the independence of the parallels axiom. I show that this is mistaken: Frege distinguished two approaches to independence arguments and his puzzling remarks apply only to one of them. Not only did Frege not rej...
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Frege’s most celebrated paper “On Sense and Reference” begins with a puzzle. The sentences “a=a” and “a=b” superficially strike the reader as being different kinds of claims. Among other things, “a=a” seems to be trivially true, even self-evident. On the other hand, “a=b” is an informative sentence. It is of a kind important to many episodes in the history of science. Deeper reflection, however...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0029-4527
DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1038336845