Fractional Hedonic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fractional hedonic games
An important issue in multi-agent systems is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. We initiate the formal study of fractional hedonic games. In fractional hedonic games, the utility of a player in a coalition structure is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which there are several types of agents and eac...
متن کاملWelfare Maximization in Fractional Hedonic Games
We consider the computational complexity of computing welfare maximizing partitions for fractional hedonic games—a natural class of coalition formation games that can be succinctly represented by a graph. For such games, welfare maximizing partitions constitute desirable ways to cluster the vertices of the graph. We present both intractability results and approximation algorithms for computing ...
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Coalition formation provides a versatile framework for analyzing cooperative behavior in multi-agent systems. In particular, hedonic coalition formation has gained considerable attention in the literature. An interesting class of hedonic games recently introduced by Aziz et al. [3] are fractional hedonic games. In these games, the utility an agent assigns to a coalition is his average valuation...
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Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on thi...
متن کاملOn the Price of Stability of Fractional Hedonic Games
We consider fractional hedonic games, where self-organized groups (or clusters) are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent and selfish players and the happiness of each player in a group is the average value she ascribes to its members. We adopt Nash stable outcomes, that is states where no player can improve her utility by unilaterally changing her own group, as the t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3327970