Formulational vs. Epistemological Debates Concerning Scientific Realism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Van Fraassen : Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
The notion of literal construal divides anti-realists into two kinds: the kind who say that science aims to be true when construed non-literally; and kind van Fraassen belongs to, who say that while theories should be literally construed, they don’t have to be true. The first kind of anti-realist might claim e.g. that the theory of phlogiston and the modern theory of combustion say the same thi...
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I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dialogue
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0012-2173,1759-0949
DOI: 10.1017/s0012217320000062