Forecasting Sovereign Default Risk with Merton’s Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Fixed Income
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1059-8596,2168-8648
DOI: 10.3905/jfi.2015.2015.1.041