Folk Psychology: Scientific Perspectives of Realism, Eliminativism, and Instrumentalism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance
One of Dennett’s principal arguments for on instrumentolistic construal of intentionol ottributions (e.g., ottributions of belief, etc.) is that such attributions ore environment relative. I argue that one can and should odopt a realist perspective toword such ottributions, but accommodate their environmental relativity by treoting intentional properties as relational properties. By doing so on...
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son and world, scientist and fact, such that one assumes that fish exist a priori and independent of the scientist’s investigation. Organisms, however, shape their worlds as their worlds reciprocally shape them (Lewontin, 2000). Thus, the scientist who clears land on his or her property for a new tennis court will create the circumstances of a world lacking fish as facts for discovery. Cacioppo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Filozofska istraživanja
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0351-4706,1848-2309
DOI: 10.21464/fi37310