Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even t...
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The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defe...
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To Kevin, tireless organizer of philosophical research, tremendously generous supporter of young people, delightful host, brilliant philosopher (in random order). With herzlichen Dank, for the great sympathy and encouragement he has given me. I hope he will forgive me for dedicating to him this paper, which seems not to be much concerned with his philosophical work; but I am comforted by the fa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy Compass
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1747-9991
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00315.x