FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market With Flexible Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auction-Based Dynamic Spectrum Trading Market – Spectrum Allocation and Profit Sharing
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1536-1276
DOI: 10.1109/twc.2014.2360831