Fiscal Policy with Limited-Time Commitment

Fiscal policy under loose commitment

Due to time-inconsistency or political turnover, policymakers’ promises are not always fulfilled. We analyze an optimal fiscal policy problem where the plans made by the benevolent government are periodically revised. In this loose commitment setting, the properties of labor and capital income taxes are significantly different than under the full-commitment and no-commitment assumptions. Becaus...

Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment

a r t i c l e i n f o We introduce limited commitment into a standard optimal fiscal policy model in small open economies. We consider the problem of a benevolent government that signs a risk-sharing contract with the rest of the world, and that has to choose optimally distortionary taxes on labor income, domestic debt and international transfers. Both the home country and the rest of the world...

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy without commitment∗

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a stochastic economy with imperfectly competitive product markets and a discretionary government. We find that, in the flexible price economy, optimal time-consistent policy implements the Friedman rule independently of the degree of imperfect competition. This result is in contrast to the Ramsey literature, where the Friedman rule emerge...

Optimal Fiscal Policy With Oil Revenues

Auctions with Limited Commitment∗

We study auction design with limited commitment in a standard auction environment. The seller has a single object and can conduct an infinite sequence of standard auctions with reserve prices to maximize her expected profit. In each period, the seller can commit to a reserve price for the current period but cannot commit to future reserve prices. We analyze the problem with limited commitment t...