First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
First{Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge
We consider an augmented version of the symmetric private value auction model with independent types. The augmentation, intended to illustrate reality, concerns information bidders have about their opponents. To the standard assumption that every bidder knows his type and the distribution of types is common knowledge we add the assumption that the ranking of bidders' valuations is common knowle...
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Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction (or alternativel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1997
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2188