Finite Time Robust Feedback Nash Equilibrium for Linear Quadratic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic descriptor differential games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IFAC-PapersOnLine
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2405-8963
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.1990