Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered under different assumptions on the speed of adjustment. It is found that two specific refinements of mixed Nash equilibria identify focal r...
متن کاملExistence and stability of equilibria in age-structured population dynamics
The existence of positive equilibrium solutions of the McKendrick equations for the dynamics of an age-structured population is studied as a bifurcation phenomenon using the inherent net reproductive rate n as a bifurcation parameter. The local existence and uniqueness of a branch of positive equilibria which bifurcates from the trivial (identically zero) solution at the critical value n = 1 ar...
متن کاملComplexity and Mixed Strategy Equilibria∗
We propose a theory of mixed strategies in zero-sum two-person games. Given a finite zero-sum two-person game g, we extend it to collective games g∞ and g∞,S, which are infinite repetitions of the game g. Players in the collective games are restricted to use computable strategies only, but each has a complex sequence that can be used in the computation. We adopt kolmogorov complexity to define ...
متن کاملEvolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria
AND EQUILIBRIA Reinoud JOOSTEN May 1994 MERIT Research Memorandum 2/94-016 MERIT Research Memoranda can be ordered from the address below, or be obtained in electronic form (Postscript) by anonymous ftp at meritbbs.rulimburg.nl Abstract Weakly compatible population dynamics describe changes in the composition of a population in a competitive environment, driven by differences in fitness levels ...
متن کاملRational Learning of Mixed Equilibria
This paper investigates the problem of policy learning in multi-agent environments using the stochastic game framework, which we brieey overview. We introduce two properties as desirable for a learning agent when in the presence of other learning agents, namely rationality and convergence. We examine existing reinforcement learning algorithms according to these two properties and notice that th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198903001057