منابع مشابه
Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
In this paper, we consider a class of infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. We look at strongly symmetric perfect public equilibria with memory K: equilibria in which strategies are restricted to depend only on the last K observations of public signals. Define ΓK to be the set of payoffs of equilibria with memory K. We show that for some parameter settings, ΓK = Γ∞ for suf...
متن کاملFinite Memory and Imperfect Monitorint
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. We thank Steve Morris for comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are the those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
متن کاملImperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations∗
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Journal of Eco...
متن کاملImperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations1
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Liter...
متن کاملImperfect Monitoring in Communication Networks1
Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals’ network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many ine cient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others’ actions can, however, eliminate many of these ine cient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. S...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.001