Finite approximations to a zero-sum game with incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01753710