Financial Structure, Managerial Compensation and Monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Managerial Compensation and Financial Hedging in Commodity Procurement
Hedging in Commodity Procurement Masha Shunko Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15217, [email protected] Laurens Debo Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, [email protected] Lin Nan Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15217, [email protected] Nicola Secomandi Tepper School of Busin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.948728