Financial Reporting Material Misstatements, Earnings Conservatism and Managerial Replacement Decisions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Purpose: Based on signal theory and legitimacy theory, this paper examines whether firms with financial reporting misstatements (restatements) would prefer conservative to send signals regarding their determinants of improving credibility legitimate organizational image in Taiwan. This further these reduce the demand for after replacing managers reveal restatements.
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2408-0098', '2408-0101']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25103/ijbesar.141.01