Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured (FISIM): The role of reference rate
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How Should Financial Intermediation Services be Taxed?
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Statistical Journal of the IAOS
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1874-7655,1875-9254
DOI: 10.3233/sji-160280