Financial Intermediation and Delegated Security Design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financial Intermediation
The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, making them a central institution of economic growth. Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment. In contrast, in capital markets investors contract directly with firms, creating marketable securities. The prices o...
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I ssues relating to fi nancial stability have always been part of the macroeconomics curriculum, but they have often been presented as mainly of historical interest, or primarily of relevance to emerging markets. However, the recent fi nancial crisis has made it plain that even in economies like the United States, signifi cant disruptions of fi nancial intermediation remain a possibility. Under...
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We explain informed capital by showing that projects can be screened by comparing loan applicants. Because efficient comparing requires centralized monitoring, it represents a novel rationale for financial intermediation. Positive scale effects may make a single monopoly intermediary optimal. Comparing can also eliminate the problems of adverse selection and inefficient investments.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1361863