Financial Crises: Systemic or Idiosyncratic
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk∗
This chapter surveys the literature on bubbles, financial crises, and systemic risk. The first part of the chapter provides a brief historical account of bubbles and financial crisis. The second part of the chapter gives a structured overview of the literature on financial bubbles. The third part of the chapter discusses the literatures on financial crises and systemic risk, with particular emp...
متن کاملFinancial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Circumstances or Structural Weakness?
Recent studies have conjectured that there may be a link between financial liberalization and financial instability in emerging economies. Most of these studies, however, do not investigate whether emerging economies are becoming structurally more vulnerable to currency and banking crises. In this paper, we argue that emerging economies are systematically becoming more susceptible to both curre...
متن کاملFinancial Crises and Political Crises∗
The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...
متن کاملAppendix to "Financial Crises and Political Crises"
PBE Type i: Neither default nor political crisis If V ≤ χL, the costs of default are always larger than the costs of servicing the debt even for the benevolent government. Then in equilibrium, the government proposes to service the debt, which is accepted by the representative agent. Hence the debt is repaid and political crisis is avoided. Neither the benevolent government nor the self interes...
متن کاملIdiosyncratic risk and financial policy
In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete. © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D52; D60; H20
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.171533