Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation in Wholesale Electricity Markets Using Nash Bargaining Theory

Equilibrium in Wholesale Electricity Markets

We develop game theoretic models to evaluate strategic behavior in deregulated electricity markets, with particular attention given to the market rules in place in California through the summer of 2000. We prove existence of a Nash equilibrium under two particular sets of market rules used by the CALPX and CAISO respectively. Next we derive a lower bound (strictly above marginal cost) on averag...

Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets

The traditional measure of market power is the HHI, which gives implausible results given the low elasticity of demand in electricity spot markets, unless it is adapted to take account of contracting. In its place the Residual Supply Index has been proposed as a more suitable index to measure potential market power in electricity markets, notably in California and more recently in the EU Sector...

Demand Management in Restructured Wholesale Electricity Markets

Stochastic Optimization of Demand Response Aggregators in Wholesale Electricity Markets

This paper proposes a stochastic framework for demand response (DR) aggregator to procure DR from customers and sell it to purchasers in the wholesale electricity market. The aggregator assigns fixed DR contracts with customers based on three different load reduction strategies. In the presented problem the uncertainty of market price is considered and the risk of aggregator participation is ma...

Cash-settled options for wholesale electricity markets

Wholesale electricity market designs in practice do not provide the market participants with adequate mechanisms to hedge their financial risks. Demanders and suppliers will likely face even greater risks with the deepening penetration of variable renewable resources like wind and solar. This paper explores the design of a centralized cash-settled call option market to mitigate such risks. A ca...