Fictitious play in games: Chaos and dithering behaviour
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fictitious play in 3x3 games: Chaos and dithering behaviour
In the 60’s Shapley provided an example of a two player fictitious game with periodic behaviour. In this game, player A aims to copy B’s behaviour and player B aims to play one ahead of player A. In this paper we continue to study a family of games which generalize Shapley’s example by introducing an external parameter, and prove that there exists an abundance of periodic and chaotic behavior w...
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Fictitious play is a popular game-theoretic model of learning in games. However, it has received little attention in practical applications to large problems. This paper introduces two variants of fictitious play that are implemented in behavioural strategies of an extensive-form game. The first variant is a full-width process that is realization equivalent to its normal-form counterpart and th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.004