منابع مشابه
Family size and optimal income taxation
This paper studies the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation. We consider a second best setting where the government observes the number of children and the income of the parents but not their productivity. With a linear tax schedule the marginal tax rate is shown to decrease with the number of children, while the relationship between the demogrant and family size appears...
متن کاملFamily Social Security taxes compared with Federal income taxes, 1979.
Increases in Social Security taxes during the past decade or so have prompted frequent comparisons of Social Security taxes and Federal personal income taxes. In this article, new evidence is brought to bear on this issue. Two specific questions are addressed: For 1979, what percentage of family units paid more in Social Security tax than in Federal income tax? How did this relationship between...
متن کاملIncome taxation and marital decisions
Differential tax treatment of married and single people is a key feature of the tax code in the US and other countries. We analyze its equilibrium and welfare effects in a matching model with search frictions and nontransferable utility. We find that an increase in taxes on married people unambiguously reduces the equilibrium number of marriages, but it need not make both men and women more rel...
متن کاملTaxation of Interest Income
Why is interest income taxed so much more heavily than other forms of capital income? This differential tax treatment has generated substantial tax arbitrage, resulting in lower tax revenue, efficiency costs, and apparently net gains to rich borrowers and net losses to poor lenders, together suggesting that this tax treatment makes no sense on welfare grounds. In examining this argument more fo...
متن کاملVoting over income taxation
A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task. We d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Stanford Law Review
سال: 1975
ISSN: 0038-9765
DOI: 10.2307/1228181