Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

We de…ne feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for twoperson Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player ...

Satisficing Games: Moving Beyond Individual Rationality

Von Neumann-Morgenstern game theory is the multi-agent instantiation of individual rationality and is the standard for decision-making in group settings. Individual rationality, however, requires each player to optimize its own performance regardless of the effect so doing has on the other players, and does not accommodate a definitive notion of group preference. By replacing the demand for doi...

A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS

In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...

Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games

In single-person decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function (or NMUF) that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the agent receives new information, it also requires subjective probabilities to be revised according to ...

Zero-Sum Two Person Games