Fault Tolerant Infective Countermeasure for AES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fault Tolerant Infective Countermeasure for AES
Infective countermeasures have been a promising class of fault attack countermeasures. However, they have been subjected to several attacks owing to lack of formal proofs of security and improper implementations. In this paper, we first provide a formal information theoretic proof of security for one of the most recently proposed infective countermeasures against DFA, under the assumption that ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2509-3428,2509-3436
DOI: 10.1007/s41635-017-0006-1