“Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Comment on “How Portable is Level-0 Behavior? A Test of Level-k Theory in Games with Non-neutral Frames” by Heap, Rojo-Arjona, and Sugden
Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and Rubinstein (1999) reported experiments that elicited initial responses to coordination, discoordination, and hide and seek games with non-neutral decision labelings, in which behavior responded to labeling. Crawford and Iriberri (2007ab) proposed a level-k model to account for the results for hide and seek games. Heap, R...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.008