منابع مشابه
Labor Taxes, Productivity and Tax Competition
Why are taxes higher in Europe than in the US? We propose that it stems from lesser competition across jurisdictions within Europe. We embed self-interested governments and tax competition into a standard neoclassical growth model with public goods. While greater jurisdictional competition reduces taxes it also reduces societal investment in public capital and thus often ends up reducing total ...
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BACKGROUND Of the many proposals to counter the obesity epidemic, the most contentious is the use of the “fat tax”. Previous investigations of the efficacy of price-based initiatives in altering consumption behavior have yielded contradictory findings. METHODS We use six years of milk sales data from 1,500 stores to investigate whether price incentives induce substitution to healthier alternati...
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This paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions (and/or states). If one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes, and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite, then (in Nash equilibrium) the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate, housing consumption is sub...
متن کاملThe Copts’ taxes in the tax system of Mamalik
Due to the lack of a regular and stable system and difficulties in budget management, tax affairs during the Mamalik era (648-923) was transforming continuously. Since, part of the Mamalik’s incomes, like previous governments, was based on collecting taxes from non-Muslim Copts, sources of this period indicate that due to various factors, Mamliks have been forced to make changes in the way of t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Modern Science
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1734-2031,2391-789X
DOI: 10.13166/jms/113387