Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the set of stable matchings when individuals are farsighted and they choose their objections optimally along a objection path. use solution concept called maximal (MFS), which is an adaptation concepts developed in Dutta Vohra (2017) Vartiainen (2020) to one-to-one matching problems. MFS always exists, but it need not be unique. There unique largest that contains all other, equal consistent Chwe (1994). This implies embodies idea maximality
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1095-7235', '0022-0531']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105499