False triviality of truth

As it stands, Frege’s semantic theory does not provide sufficient general keys for interpreting assertible sentences at different levels of complexity, such as (a) counterfactual-modal-intensional and (b) extensional sentences. It is possible to devise that key by adding non-classical parameters worlds, which allow with a high degree non-extensional complexity occupy trivial place in Tarski’s hierarchy T-scheme-eligible substitutes. The paper argues finding these non-false (if true) conditions under complex propositions can be trivially treated eligible T-scheme substitutes trivial. challenge requires several consistency improvements deal various competing extensions the predicate “true”. We will conclude Frege-Tarski’s conception (enriched non- classical presuppositions), misrepresents challenge. distorts problem we face daily practice strengthen our assertion systems, plan successful strategies, protect assertions from value reversals. true us pragmatic cannot confuse (1) complicated scientific empirical assertiveness (2) rewardable scoring-conditions one learns use his native language.