False Data Injection Attacks and the Distributed Countermeasure in DC Microgrids

In this article, we consider a hierarchical control-based dc microgrid (DCmG) equipped with unknown input observer (UIO)-based detectors, where the potential false data injection (FDI) attacks and distributed countermeasure are investigated. First, find that vulnerability of UIO-based detector originates from lack knowledge true inputs. Zero trace stealthy (ZTS) can be launched by secretly faking inputs, under which detection residual will not altered, impact on DCmG in terms voltage balancing current sharing is theoretically analyzed. Then, to mitigate ZTS attack, propose an automatic timely based average point common coupling obtained dynamic consensus (DAC) estimator. The integrity communicated utilized DAC estimators guaranteed via parameters perturbed fixed period concealed attackers. Finally, mitigation performance proposed rigorously investigated, extensive simulations conducted Simulink/PLECS validate theoretical results.