False-belief task know-how

Abstract This paper assumes that success on false-belief tasks requires a kind of folk psychological know-how, i.e. gradable knowledge how to perform skilful social cognitive acts. Following Ryle (Proceedings the Aristotelian Society, 1946, The Concept Mind, Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1949), it argues know-how required for task cannot be reduced conceptual as this would lead an infinite regress. Within skilled performance literature, Intellectualists (Stanley and Williams in Journal Philosophy 98:411–444, 2001) have attempted solve Ryle’s regress by appealing automatic mechanisms similar some Theory-of-Mind explanations psychology. Exploring similarity, examines epistemic commitments two recent pragmatic accounts (Westra Carruthers Cognition 158:165–176, 2017; Fenici Phenomenology Cognitive Sciences, 2020) cross-cultural data (Shahaeian et al. Developmental Psychology 47:1239–1247, 2011). By drawing Fridland’s (Philosophical Studies 165:879–891, 2012) argument against Intellectualist is argued neither these can adequately explain escape objection if are indeed committed Intellectualism. ends supplementing Fenici’s (Phenomenology account with enactive framework both bolster explanation avoid objection.