Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fairness , Incentives , and Contractual Choices
This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete contracts although the standard self-interest model predicts that they should prefer the more complete contract. Our theoretical analysis shows that fairnes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00046-x