Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance.
In the traditional deterrence approach, taxpayers were considered as purely self-interested rational agents (Allingham & Sandmo 1972), and consequently, compliance was enforced by measures such as audits and sanctions. In the late nineties, a new method of regulation was proposed. This approach, the responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992), integrated the various measures to ensure comp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12232