Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers

Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers

Audited reputation ☆

Article history: Received 6 January 2007 Received in revised form 6 February 2008 Accepted 26 February 2008 Available online 6 March 2008 We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism,...

On Dealing with Adversaries Fairly

Peer-to-peer systems are often vulnerable to disruption by minorities. There are several strategies for dealing with this problem, but ultimately many of them come down to some kind of voting or collaborative filtering mechanism. Yet there exists a large literature on voting theory, also known as social choice theory. In this note we outline some of its key results and try to apply them to a nu...

High Performance Audited Traffic Capture

In [1], Rescorla and Dick proposed using passive session recording and timestamping to provide third-party auditing capabilities for SSL. This approach enables dispute resolution for electronic transactions without modifying existing applications or installing client-side PKI. The practicality of such a system approach requires both costeffective deployment and secure capture at network speeds....

On IRS’s Servicing and Auditing Taxpayers

We consider a model of tax compliance, in which the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) services as well as audits taxpayers as in the real world. Taxpayers are uncertain about whether their incomes are eligible for deduction or exemption and may seek advice from the IRS’s provided taxpayer service to mitigate the uncertainty. It is shown that: (i) depending on the size of taxpayer service, taxpayer...