Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Random Quadratic Assignment Problem
The quadratic assignment problem, QAP, is one of the most difficult of all combinatorial optimization problems. Here, we use an abbreviated application of the statistical mechanics replica method to study the asymptotic behavior of instances in which the entries of at least one of the two matrices that specify the problem are chosen from a random distribution P . Surprisingly, the QAP has not b...
متن کاملThe Random Hypergraph Assignment Problem
Parisi’s famous (proven) conjecture states that the expected cost of an optimal assignment in a complete bipartite graph on n + n nodes with i. i. d. exponential edge costs with mean 1 is ∑n i=1 1/i , which converges to an asymptotic limit of π/6 as n tends to infinity. We consider a generalization of this question to complete “partitioned” bipartite hypergraphs G2,n that contain edges of size ...
متن کاملFair and Efficient Solutions to the Santa Fe Bar Problem
This paper asks the question: can adaptive, but not necessarily rational, agents learn Nash equilibrium behavior in the Santa Fe Bar Problem? To answer this question, three learning algorithms are simulated: fictitious play, no-regret learning, and Q-learning. Conditions under which these algorithms can converge to equilibrium behavior are isolated. But it is noted that the pure strategy Nash e...
متن کاملAsymptotics in the random assignment problem
In the deterministic assignment problem, there are n jobs, n machines and a n x n non-negative matrix (t j,,,) representing the cost of performing job j on machine m. An assignment is a permutation ~ of {1, ..., n}, indicating that job j is assigned to machine ~(j). The optimal assignment has cost min~tj ,~(j) , j the minimum taken over permutations re. For the random assignment problem we defi...
متن کاملCompetitive Equilibrium in the Random Assignment Problem
This paper studies the problem of random assignment with fractional endowments. Fractional endowments complicate matters because the assignment has to make an agent weakly better off than his endowment. I first formulate an exchange economy that resembles the random assignment problem and prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in this economy. I then propose a pseudo-market mechanism fo...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.006