Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fair Representation and a Linear Shapley Rule
When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US Electoral College, etc.). The Penrose square root rule (PSRR) is the main benchmark for ‘fair representation’ of all bottom-tier voters in the top-tier decision making body, but rests on the restrictive assumption of ...
متن کاملA Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games
the University of Tokyo. Special thanks are due to Hideshi Itoh for suggesting the application to contract theory during the seminar at Osaka University. The usual disclaimer applies. Abstract: In potential games, as considered by Monderer and Shapley (1996a), each player's gain from a deviation is equal to the gain in a potential function. We prove that a game has a potential function if and o...
متن کاملA non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule∗
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. In this paper, a non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach
متن کاملFair Allocation with Succinct Representation
Motivated by applications in guaranteed delivery in computational advertising, we consider the general problem of fair allocation in a bipartite supply-demand setting. Our formulation captures the notion of deviation from fairness by a convex penalty function. While this formulation admits a convex programming solution, we strive for more timeand space-efficient algorithms. For the case of L1 p...
متن کاملEgalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
A bargaining rule is ordinally invariant if its solutions are independent of which utility functions are chosen to represent the agents’ preferences. For two agents, only dictatorial bargaining rules satisfy this property (Shapley, L., La Décision: Agrégation et Dynamique des Ordres de Préférence, Editions du CNRS (1969) 251). For three agents, we construct a “normalized subclass” of problems t...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.002