Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that stable typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair matchings. We characterize such matchings by fixed points certain function. Building this result, the class constraints individual schools under which there exists student-optimal matching, is most preferred every student among those satisfying three desirable properties. study numerical relevance our theory using data government-organized daycare allocation.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0034-6527', '1467-937X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad046