Fair and private rewarding in a coalitional game of cybersecurity information sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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پژوهش حاضر به بررسی رابطه بین تسهیم دانش و چابکی سازمانی در شرکت توزیع برق استان اصفهان پرداخته است . ابزار سنجش در این پژوهش پرسشنامه می باشد . به منظور سنجش متغیر تسهیم دانش از پرسشنامه وانگ و وانگ و جهت سنجش چابکی سازمانی از پرسشنامه چاربونیر استفاده شده است . هدف پژوهش حاضر تحلیل رابطه میان تسهیم دانش و چابکی سازمانی از دید کارکنان شرکت توزیع برق استان اصفهان می باشد . جامعه آماری این پژوه...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IET Information Security
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1751-8709,1751-8717
DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2018.5079