Failure of ad valorem and specific tax equivalence under uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Failure of Ad Valorem and Specific Tax Equivalence under Uncertainty
Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are “almost never” equivalent in the presence of uncertainty if we demand equivalence to hold pathwise. Since we obtain this re...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1742-7355
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12046