Factors discriminating catalog buyers and noncatalog buyers of clothings.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managing Strategic Buyers∗
We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing n buyers with independent private values. The monopolist posts prices but has no commitment power. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts una...
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There are many situations in which buyers have a significant stake in what a firm learns about their demands. Specifically, any time that price discrimination is possible on an individual bases and repeat purchases are likely, buyers possess incentives for strategic manipulation of demand information. A simple two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the demand parameter ...
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The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer can disclose his type (e.g. age, income, experience) at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a price list, including a “sticker price” available to any buyer and a schedule of discounts available to those who disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications of such a prici...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Sen'i Kikai Gakkaishi (Journal of the Textile Machinery Society of Japan)
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0371-0580,1880-1994
DOI: 10.4188/transjtmsj.43.7_p421